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Abstract
In the realm of environmental policy instrument choice, there is great divergence
between the recommendations of normative economic theory and positive political reality.
Four gaps stand out.  First, despite the advantages of market-based policy instruments, they
have been used to a minor degree, compared with conventional, command-and-control
instruments.  Second, pollution-control standards have typically been much more stringent for
new than for existing sources, despite the inefficiency of this approach.  Third, in the few
instances in which market-based instruments have been adopted, they have nearly always taken
the form of grandfathered tradeable permits, rather than auctioned permits or pollution taxes,
despite the advantages in some situations of these other instruments.  Fourth, the political
attention given to market-based environmental policy instruments has increased dramatically in
recent years.  We search for explanations for these four apparent anomalies by drawing upon
intellectual traditions from economics, political science, and law.  We find that all fit quite well
within an equilibrium framework, based upon the metaphor of a political market.  In general,
explanations from economics tend to refer to the demand for environmental policy instruments,
while explanations from political science refer to the supply side.  Overall, we find that there
are compelling theoretical explanations for the four apparent anomalies, although these
theories have yet to be empirically verified.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The design of environmental policy requires that two central questions be addressed:
(1) what is the desired level of environmental protection? and (2) what policy instruments
should be used to achieve this level of protection?  With respect to the second question, thirty
years of positive political reality in the United States have diverged strikingly from the
recommendations of normative economic theory.  Our purpose in this paper is to explain why.
Four gaps between normative theory and positive reality merit particular attention.
First, economists have consistently urged the use of "market-based" or "economic-incentive"
instruments -- principally pollution taxes or charges1 and systems of tradeable permits2 --
rather than so-called "command-and-control" instruments, such as design standards, which
require the use of a particular technology, or, as is more commonly the case, performance
standards, which prescribe the maximum amount of pollution that a source can emit.3  At least
in theory, market-based instruments minimize the aggregate cost of achieving a given level of
environmental protection,4 and provide dynamic incentives for the adoption and diffusion of
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1 The development of the notion of a corrective tax on pollution is generally credited to Pigou (1920).
2 The initial proposal for a system of tradeable permits to control pollution was by Dales (1968), and was first
formalized by Montgomery (1972), although much of the literature can be traced back to Coase (1960).
3 Performance standards could specify an absolute quantity of permissible emissions (that is, a given quantity of
emissions per unit of time), but more typically these standards establish allowable emissions in proportional
terms (that is, quantity of emissions per unit of product output or per unit of a particular input).  We use the
term "standard" to refer somewhat generically to command-and-control approaches.  Except where stated
otherwise, we refer to proportional performance standards.
4 As is well known, a necessary condition for the achievement of such cost-minimization is that the marginal
costs of abatement be equal for all sources (Baumol and Oates 1988).  In theory, pollution taxes and systems of
marketable permits induce this effect, at least under specified conditions.-2- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
cheaper and better control technologies.5  Despite these advantages, market-based instruments
have been used far less frequently than command-and-control standards (U.S. Congress, Office
of Technology Assessment 1995).
Second, when command-and-control standards have been used, the required level of
pollution abatement has generally been far more stringent for new sources than for existing
sources.  This dual system may actually worsen pollution by encouraging firms to keep older,
dirtier plants in operation.6
Third, in the relatively rare instances in which market-based instruments have been
adopted, they have nearly always taken the form of tradeable permits rather than emission
taxes,7 although economic theory suggests that the optimal choice between the two is
dependent upon case-specific factors.8  Moreover, the initial allocation of such permits has
been through "grandfathering," or free initial distribution based on existing levels of pollution,9
rather than through auctions, despite the apparent economic superiority of the latter
mechanism.10  Thus, we can say that there are four alternative market-based instruments
                                               
5 Market-based systems can provide continuous dynamic incentives for adoption of superior technologies, since
under such systems it is always in the interest of firms to clean up more if sufficiently inexpensive clean-up
technologies can be identified (Milliman and Prince 1989; Jaffe and Stavins 1995).
6 New plants ought to have somewhat more stringent standards because their abatement costs are lower,
although such standards should be linked with actual abatement costs, not with the proxy of plant vintage.
When new source standards are sufficiently more stringent, however, they can give rise to an "old-plant" effect,
precluding plant replacements that would otherwise take place (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Stewart
1981).  There is empirical evidence that differential environmental regulations lengthen the time before plants
are retired (Maloney and Brady 1988; Nelson, Tietenberg, and Donihue 1993).
7 Taxes (so-called unit charges) have been used in some communities for municipal solid waste collection (U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1995).  Gasoline taxes serve primarily as revenue-raising instruments,
rather than environmental (Pigouvian) taxes per se.  Interestingly, the European experience is the reverse:
environmental taxes are far more prevalent than tradeable permits, although the taxes employed have typically
been too low to induce pollution abatement (Stewart 1996).  A more comprehensive positive analysis of instrument
choice than we provide here would seek to explain this difference between the European and U.S. experiences.
8 With perfect information, tradeable permits sold at auction have the same effect as a tax.  Under conditions of
uncertainty, the relative efficiency of tradeable permits and fixed tax rates depends upon the relative slopes of
the relevant marginal benefit and marginal cost functions (Weitzman 1974; Yohe 1978; Stavins 1996).
9 The sulfur dioxide (SO2) allowance program -- a tradeable permit program to reduce acid rain -- mandated
by the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 provides for annual auctions in addition to grandfathering, but such
auctions involve less than 3 percent of the total allocation (Bailey 1996).  These auctions have proven to be a
trivial part of the overall program (Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey 1996).
10 With perfect information and no transactions costs, trading will result in the economically efficient outcome
independently of the initial distribution of permits (Montgomery 1972; Coase 1960; Hahn and Noll 1982).
Under more realistic scenarios, however, there are compelling arguments for the superiority of auctioned
permits.  First, auctions are more cost-effective in the presence of certain kinds of transactions costs (StavinsThe Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -3-
available:  taxes, revenue-neutral taxes, auctioned permits, and grandfathered permits.11
Despite the numerous trade-offs that exist in normative economic terms, the U.S. experience
has been dominated by one choice -- grandfathered permits.
A fourth, conceptually different, gap, between prior and current political practice, is
also worthy of attention.  In recent years, the political process has been more receptive to
market-based instruments,12 even though they continue to be a small part of the overall
portfolio of existing environmental laws and regulations.  After being largely ignored for so
long, why have incentive-based instruments begun to gain acceptance in recent years?
Commentators have advanced various explanations for the existence of these four gaps
between normative theory and positive reality.  Some explanations emerge from formal
theories.  Others take the form of informal hypotheses:  they purport to explain certain aspects
of environmental policy, but are not part of a formal theory of political behavior.  In this paper,
we review, evaluate, and extend these explanations.  Moreover, we place these disparate
explanations within the framework of an equilibrium model of instrument choice in
environmental policy, based upon the metaphor of a political market.
This framework -- informed by intellectual traditions within economics, political science,
and law -- enables us to organize and synthesize existing theories and empirical evidence about
observed departures of normative prescription from political reality.  The scope of the paper,
however, is limited.  Our emphasis is on the control of pollution rather than the management of
                                                
1995).  Second, the revenue raised by an auction mechanism can be used to finance a reduction in some
distortionary tax (Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw 1996).  Instruments that restrict production (that pollutes) --
such as tradeable permits -- can create entry barriers that raise product prices, reduce the real wage, and
exacerbate pre-existing labor supply distortions, an effect that can be offset if the government sells (auctions)
the permits, retains the scarcity rents, and recycles the revenue by reducing distortionary labor taxes (Fullerton
and Metcalf 1966).  Third, auctions provide greater incentives for firms to develop substitutes for regulated
products, by requiring firms to pay for permits rather than giving them rents (Hahn and McGartland 1989).
Fourth, the revenue raised by auctions may provide administrative agencies with an incentive to monitor
compliance (Ackerman and Stewart 1985).  Fifth, grandfathering, if accepted as general practice, could lead
unregulated firms to increase their emissions in order to maximize the pollution rights that they obtain if there
is a transition to a market-based system (Dewees 1983).
11 In a deterministic setting and abstracting from a set of other issues, a revenue-neutral emission tax can be
designed which is equivalent to a grandfathered tradeable permit system.  Likewise, under such conditions, a
simple emission tax will be roughly equivalent to an auctioned permit system.
12 Beginning in the 1970's, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) offered states the option of
employing variants of tradeable permits for the control of localized, criteria air pollutants (Hahn 1989).  More
significantly, tradeable-permit systems were used in the 1980's to accomplish the phasedown of lead in gasoline
(Kerr and Maré 1995) and to facilitate the phasedown of ozone-depleting chloroflourocarbons (CFC's); and in
the 1990's to cut nationwide SO2 emissions by 50 percent by the year 2005 (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency 1996), to achieve ambient ozone reductions in the northeast, and to implement stricter local air
pollution controls in the Los Angeles metropolitan region.-4- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
natural resources.  We treat Congress, rather than administrative agencies, as the locus of
instrument choice decisions; and we view legislators (rather than regulators) as the "suppliers"
of regulation.13  Moreover, we focus exclusively on the choice among the instruments, such as
tradeable permits, taxes, and standards, used to achieve a given level of environmental
protection.  We do not explore the related issues of how the level of protection is chosen or
enforced.  Nor do we address why Congress chooses to delegate authority to administrative
agencies in the first place (Fiorina 1982).  Finally, our outlook is positive, not normative:  we
seek to understand why we have the set of tools we do, rather than which tools are desirable.
In Part 2 of the paper, we review the relevant intellectual traditions in economics,
political science, and law; and in Part 3, we present the key features of our equilibrium
framework.  In Part 4, we consider the demand for environmental policy instruments; and in
Part 5, we examine the supply side.  Finally, in Part 6, we present some conclusions.
2.   INTELLECTUAL  TRADITIONS
Positive theories of policy instrument choice find their roots in the broader study of
government regulation, a vast literature which has been well-reviewed elsewhere (Romer and
Rosenthal 1987).  For our purposes, the literature can be divided into three approaches to
explaining government regulation:  demand-driven explanations; supply-driven explanations;
and explanations incorporating the interaction between demand and supply.
Explanations that draw heavily on the demand for regulation are grounded largely in
economics.  Not surprisingly, economists have generally concentrated on the demand for
economic (rather than social) regulation, devoting most attention to the interests of affected
firms.  The "economic theory of regulation," initiated by Stigler (1971) and developed further
by Posner (1974), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983), suggests that much regulation is not
imposed on firms but demanded by them, as a means of harnessing the coercive power of the
state to restrict entry, support prices, or provide direct cash subsidies.14  A related strand of
                                               
13 We do not intend, however, to deny the importance of executive branch departments and administrative
agencies, such as the EPA.  For example, the intra-firm emission trading programs of the 1970's were largely
the direct creation of EPA.
14 Stigler's (1971) influential paper has been characterized as breaking with a previously dominant view
(among economists) that regulation was initiated to correct market imperfections; see, for example, the
discussion in Posner (1974).  It is worth noting that as far back as Schattschneider (1935), political scientists
recognized the importance of economic interests among groups pressuring Congress.  The "capture theory of
regulation" in political science was already well developed by the time of Stigler's work.  Stigler's main
contribution was less his recognition that economic interests will seek favorable regulation than his
introduction of that insight into the economics literature and his application of economic models of behavior
(i.e., treating political parties as resource maximizers) to explanations of policy formulation.The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -5-
literature, following Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Tullock (1967), has likewise
emphasized rent-seeking behavior.
In many of these economic analyses, the supply side -- the political process itself -- is
virtually ignored (Laffont and Tirole 1993; Romer and Rosenthal 1987).  In an approach that
typifies this demand-driven approach, Buchanan and Tullock (1975) examine private industry's
preferences for regulation and simply assume that those policy preferences will prevail.
Similarly, Becker (1983) models the resource allocation decisions of competing interest groups
and assumes that the policy outcome depends solely on the relative pressures exerted by
interest groups.
Even when they model political processes, however, economic explanations of
regulation have often remained driven by firm demand.  In Stigler's analysis (1971) and
Peltzman's elaboration (1976), the state enacts the program of whichever industry (or, more
generally, interest group) offers the most resources to the governing party; regulation goes to
the "highest bidder."15  Thus, private industry will tend to be regulated where and when the
benefits to firms from government regulation are highly concentrated, but the costs are widely
dispersed.16  The "government" simply acts to maximize an exogenous "political support
function" and thus caters to the more powerful group.  Hahn (1990) follows a conceptually
similar tack, modeling a single policy maker's decision as responding to a weighted sum of
industry interests and environmental interests; but he does not seek to explain the determinants
of either supply or demand.
Political actors are included in these analyses, but they are treated as economic agents
reacting somewhat mechanically to the resources or the demands of interest groups.  In many
cases, as in the Stigler-Peltzman model, they have no interest other than collecting political
contributions.  Moreover, government is treated as a monolith, controlled by a single political
party, with regulatory agencies and legislatures combined into a single unit.  There is no room in
these accounts for constituency pressures, variation among legislators, slack between legislative
direction and the actions of administrative agencies, or other supply-side phenomena.
                                               
15 The Stigler-Peltzman model is essentially a policy auction.
16 Peanut regulation provides an excellent example of the effect of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs
(Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington 1995).  Quotas, import restrictions, and price supports combined in 1982-
1987 to transfer an average of $255 million a year from consumers to producers, with a deadweight loss of $34
million.  The annual cost to each consumer was only $1.23; each peanut farmer, on the other hand, gained
$11,100.  Peanut farmers clearly had an incentive to preserve the program, while any individual consumer had
little to gain from dismantling it.-6- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
Political scientists and economists studying the supply side of regulation (and of
legislation more generally) have focused on the voting behavior of legislators and the
institutional structure of the legislature.  The standard approach by political scientists to
explaining voting behavior has generally been based upon interview and survey data.  In this
way, Kingdon (1989) argues that Congressmen are most influenced by colleagues and
constituents in deciding how to vote.  To explain voting behavior and examine regulatory
policy, several researchers have sought to estimate the relative importance of ideology,
constituent interests, and interest groups in roll-call voting (Kalt and Zupan 1984; Kau and
Rubin 1979; Peltzman 1984).  Kalt and Zupan (1984) find that legislators vote not only based
on the economic interests of their constituents (as the economic theory of regulation assumes),
but also on the basis of their ideology.17
A second line of inquiry on the supply side has investigated the role of institutional
structure in the legislature.  The policy outcome in Congress depends not only on the voting
preferences of individual legislators, but also on features such as decision rules, the order of
voting, and especially the powers of committees (and their chairmen) to control the agenda of
the legislature.18  Further, expectations of subsequent problems of overseeing implementation
of regulatory policy by administrative agencies may influence legislators in their choice of
regulatory procedures and instruments (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989).
Just as the Stigler-Peltzman model incorporates politicians but remains fundamentally
demand-driven, the approach taken by Denzau and Munger (1986), Grier and Munger (1993),
and others acknowledges the role of interest groups but is driven by supply-side factors.  There
are discussions of the costs to legislators of supplying legislation to interest groups, but the
models rely on a "supply price" determined solely by the characteristics of legislators.19
Relatively few works have taken an equilibrium approach by considering the interaction
of the supply and demand for regulation.  Those that have considered such linkages have
typically focused on the role of campaign contributions.  Ben-Zion and Aden (1974) modeled
campaign contributions from profit-maximizing firms to vote-maximizing politicians.  In their
model, candidates choose optimal policy positions that balance the need to get votes (by
moving towards the policy preferences of voters) and the need to secure campaign funds (by
                                               
17 Their econometric analysis has been criticized by Jackson and Kingdon (1992).
18 A review of the recent literature on Congressional institutions is provided by Shepsle and Weingast (1994).
19 Silberman and Durden (1976) and Durden, Shogren, and Silberman  (1991), in their empirical studies of
interest group contributions, seem to have in mind a "market model" of interest group contributions to
legislators where interest groups offer campaign contributions and votes in return for political support.The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -7-
moving towards the preferences of contributors).20  In a similar vein, Austen-Smith (1987)
develops a game-theoretic model of campaign contributions by interest groups and policy
positions adopted by legislators.
Kau, Canaan and Rubin (1982) consider legislative outcomes directly, modeling the
determination of campaign contributions, legislator's floor votes, and constituents' votes, but
without advancing a theoretical model of legislative behavior.  Finally, Campos (1989)
explicitly considers the interaction of interest group demand and legislative supply of policy
instruments.  In his model, the choice of regulatory instrument is the equilibrium of a game
between interest groups (who choose how much to allocate to lobbying in support of their
preferred instrument) and legislators (who vote for the instrument that maximizes their
support, taking into account the contributions from the interest groups).
Despite the relative scarcity of equilibrium models of positive political economy, the
metaphor of a "political market" has frequently been employed in the public choice literature.
The works that have used the market metaphor seem to have had three distinct markets in
mind.  One market is the market for votes within a legislature: legislators are at once
demanders and suppliers of votes as they engage in vote-trading and logrolling.  Other market
models focus on the distribution of wealth resulting from legislation: the demanders are the
beneficiaries of legislation and the suppliers are the losers, with politicians serving as brokers
between the two groups (Rowley 1993).  Finally, perhaps the most prevalent conception of the
"political market" focuses on the exchange between legislators and constituents or interest
groups:  our work falls within this general tradition.  In previous work, the identity of
demanders and suppliers has varied; the market has been in electoral votes (with legislators
"paying" for votes with legislation) and in legislation (with voters paying for the policies with
their votes).21  In our framework, the market is in units of effective political support (for
particular public policies).
In the remainder of this paper, we develop our own metaphor of a political market
involving legislators, constituents, and interest groups in the context of instrument choice in
environmental policy.  This market framework supplements existing work by simultaneously
considering the demand for regulation, the supply of regulatory options, and the equilibrium
                                               
20 Bengal and Ben-Zion (1975) extend the model to consider the case where politicians derive utility from
adopting a platform close to their personal policy preferences.
21 Peltzman, for one, was clear that the demanders were constituents and the suppliers legislators:  "[the
essential commodity being transacted in the political market is a transfer of wealth, with constituents on the
demand side and their political representatives on the supply side" (1976, p. 212).-8- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
Figure 1 is available from the authors.The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -9-
outcome -- the choice of policy instrument in the legislature.  In this way, we strive to
synthesize works from the demand side and supply side, using them as building blocks of the
equilibrium framework.  We also seek to suggest a richer sense of the supply side than is found
in existing equilibrium models such as that of Campos (1989), incorporating legislator ideology
as well as a fuller description of the opportunity costs of supplying legislation.22
3.   A  MARKET  FRAMEWORK  FOR  EXAMINING  INSTRUMENT  CHOICE
In order to develop a framework within which various existing positive political
economy theories can be synthesized, we consider a "political market" embodied in a
legislature, and we focus on a single "commodity":  legislators' support for a given instrument
in a specific policy context.23  A schematic view of this political market is provided in
Figure 1.  Demands for various degrees of support  come from diverse interest groups,
including environmental advocacy organizations, private firms, and trade associations.  Each of
these entities has its own demand function:  a decreasing marginal willingness to pay for the
legislature's policy support (an outcome of each entity's distinct utility-maximization process),
where "payment" is in the form of political currency:  resources (monetary and other
contributions, and/or endorsements or other forms of support) that can facilitate legislators' re-
elections.  The aggregation of these diverse demands is made complex by the possibilities of
free-riding because of the public good nature of regulation.
Next, we posit that each individual legislator seeks to maximize her expected utility,
which involves the satisfaction that comes from being a member of the legislature, now and in
the future.  The result is the legislator's political-support supply function, the shape of which is
determined by her ideological predisposition, her perception of her constituents' preferences,
and the increasing opportunity cost of providing additional support for the policy instrument
(in terms of opportunity cost of expended effort, foregone future electoral votes in her home
district, and discomfort associated with departures from one's ideology).  Since each legislator
                                               
22 As noted above, we focus on Congress as the locus of policy instrument choice.  Extending the framework to
cover regulatory agencies and the courts would introduce several interesting but complex issues.  For regulatory
agencies, for example, it is important to deal with issues such as the principal-agent relationship between the
agency and Congress; the degree and nature of congressional oversight; the possibly conflicting goals of the
agency head and career bureaucrats; the objective function of the bureaucrats (for example, job security, power,
protection of expertise); and the way in which policy demanders provide payoffs to the agency.
23 By "specific policy context," we are simply referring to the fact that the demand for instruments and the
supply of instrument options are both linked to the specific environmental problems for which the instruments
are being considered.  Also, as we discuss below, the legislature in our framework selects a policy instrument
from among a range of options, including alternative policy instruments plus the status quo.-10- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
supplies units of a homogeneous product called "effective support" (at differing costs), the
individual legislators' supply functions combine to yield an aggregate supply function at the
level of the legislature.
Thus, for each instrument, a competitive equilibrium in the legislature is given by the
intersection between the aggregate political-support supply function and the aggregation of
relevant demands.24  Levels of effective support provided by individual members of the
legislature are hence equivalent to the amounts they are willing to provide at the competitive
equilibrium "price," the points of intersection  of their supply functions with the infinitely
elastic demand they face.  The aggregate support is simply the sum over legislators of their
individual levels of effective support.  The legislative outcome -- the choice of a policy
instrument -- then depends upon the relative degrees of support generated for alternative
policy instruments.
In the following sections of this part of the paper, we describe the political market's
commodity and currency, and then turn to more detailed expositions of the origins of
regulatory demand and supply, respectively.  Finally, we discuss the nature of political market
equilibria and the legislative outcomes that result.
3.1   The Political Market's Commodity and Currency
We view each legislator as supplying some degree of support for a given regulatory
instrument.  Interest groups seek to secure support from legislators in the political market.
Importantly, we take this commodity to be homogeneous among legislators.  That is, the
support produced by one legislator is equivalent to (a perfect substitute for) support produced
by any other legislator.  Hence, we think of this commodity as "effective support."25  It is a
measure of impact (output), not of effort (input).
                                               
24 We implicitly assume that the effective support provided by individual legislators can be observed.  In many
situations, this is a reasonable assumption, but in many others, it is not.  We leave to future work the explicit
incorporation of this uncertainty.
25 It might be argued that interest groups ultimately care about votes, which at the level of an individual
legislator reduces to a binary variable.  But there are several reasons to focus on support, rather than on votes
alone.  First, this approach facilitates comparisons among several instruments, since the outcome of the
legislative process is the instrument that garners the most effective support.  Second, empirical analysis has
largely failed to link campaign contributions with legislators' votes (Hall and Wayman 1990), while campaign
contributions have been found to be highly correlated with legislators' participation in committees, itself closely
linked with the notion of "effective support" (Grier and Munger 1993; Silberman and Durden 1976).  Third, the
fate of most prospective legislation is determined before it reaches the floor for a vote.  The agenda-setting
powers of committees make them virtual arbiters of whether or not bills reach the floor for voting (Shepsle and
Weingast 1987).  Once a bill reaches the floor, norms of deference may lead many members of Congressmen to
follow committee recommendations, either because of implicit logrolls among committees (Weingast andThe Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -11-
To be sure, different legislators require different amounts of effort to produce a unit of
effective support.  These variations in productivity are due to such factors as the size and
effectiveness of members' staffs, their seniority, their committee assignments, and their
leadership positions, including committee chairmanships.  Moreover, a legislator's effort may
encompass a much larger range of activities than simply voting for a given instrument:  among
other things, a legislator might hold hearings, attend committee markups, draft or sponsor
legislation, insert statements into committee reports, propose amendments, seek to influence
colleagues,  or make behind-the-scenes deals.26
We take the political currency in this market to be resources for the legislator's re-
election: not only votes, but also monetary and other contributions.27  An environmental
interest group, for example, may publicly endorse a candidate for office, or may volunteer time
and effort to mobilize votes in a legislator's district.  Other forms of "payment" (assistance) to
legislators -- such as time spent drafting legislation, or policy information provided to the
legislator -- are also valued by a legislator seeking reelection, since association with the interest
group may increase the legislator's support, and the time saved by the legislator may be spent
on activities that generate home district votes.  We incorporate home district votes, financial
contributions, and nonmonetary contributions in the currency of "resources," and we adopt a
monetary numeraire simply for purposes of convenience.
                                                
Marshall 1988) or because of recognition of committees' greater expertise (Kingdon 1989).  Votes of committee
members are usually less critical than how vigorously members provide support (Hall, 1987; Mayhew 1974).
Hence, securing the support of a relatively small number of legislators (each of whom is a highly efficient
producer of effective support) may be the primary goal of interest groups, even though the groups ultimately
care about the outcome of floor votes.  This reality is captured by our framework, with its focus on levels of
"effective support."
26 Denzau and Munger (1986) describe the range of services legislators can offer interest groups.  Silberman
and Durden (1976) analyze a similar measure of legislator participation, which they call "political support
effort."  It is worth noting that these models generally treat as an output what in our framework is an input:
namely, the effort exerted by the legislator, used to produce effective support.  We have incorporated differences
among legislators in effectiveness and productivity into the supply side (production of effective support) rather
than the demand side (demand of interest groups for support from different legislators).  For further discussion
of the ways in which Congressmen can participate in policy making, especially in committee, see: Hall (1987,
1996); and Hall and Wayman (1990).
27 Monetary contributions can be used to finance advertising campaigns, literature production and distribution,
and other activities that increase the probability of a legislator being re-elected.-12- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
3.2   Origins of Demand for Environmental Policy Instruments
We now explore the nature of demand by firms and individuals, dividing the latter
category into three overlapping groups: consumers, workers, and environmentalists.  Then we
consider the role of interest groups, such as trade associations and environmental organizations.
3.2.1   Firms and Individuals
Firms are affected by environmental regulation through the costs they incur to produce
goods and services.  Consider a price-taking firm that wishes to maximize its profit from
producing a single product and that employs a set of factors in its production, each of which
has some cost associated with it.  One of these factors or inputs is the set of relevant features
of the regulatory environment.  In seeking to maximize profits, the firm chooses levels of all its
inputs, including the efforts it puts into securing its desired regulatory environment.  By solving
its maximization problem, the firm derives its demand functions for all its inputs, including its
demand for the environmental policy instrument.  In this simplest model, individual firms have
a decreasing marginal willingness to pay to secure particular policy instruments.28  At a
minimum, a firm's demand for a policy instrument is a function of output and input prices,
including the "price of legislators' support."29
The choice of environmental policy instruments can also have an effect on individuals.
For example, individuals can be affected by the level of environmental quality that results from
the use of a particular instrument,30 or by the costs of environmental protection that are reflected
in the prices of the goods and services they buy.  Individuals might even derive some direct utility
from knowing that a particular type of policy instrument was employed.  These effects can be
reflected in a utility function.  The arguments of this function consist of the vector of public and
private goods about which the individual cares; each such good has a price associated with it.  In
maximizing his utility, the consumer is subject to a budgetary constraint.  The result is a set of
demand functions for all private and public goods, including demand functions for any
environmental policy instruments that, either directly or indirectly, affect the individual's utility.
                                               
28 The maximized objective function is the firm's profit function.  Hotelling's Lemma establishes that the factor
demand functions are downward sloping as long as the profit function is convex.
29 This stylized framework implicitly assumes that firms are profit-maximizing (or cost-minimizing) atomistic
units, and thus that there is no significant principal-agent slack between managers and shareholders.  There is
little doubt that this assumption departs from reality in many cases, but we leave its investigation to future
research.
30 We said at the outset that we were restricting our attention to the policy instruments used to achieve a given
level of protection.  As we note below, however, the choice of cost-effective instruments, for example, can lead
to the adoption of more stringent environmental standards.The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -13-
Thus, individuals, like firms, can have a decreasing marginal willingness to pay to secure
particular policy instruments.31  Their demand for a policy instrument is a function of their
income and of the relative prices of relevant goods, including the price of securing support for
their preferred instrument.
Individuals can be thought of as having attributes of "consumers," "environmentalists,"
and "workers."  These three categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive.  We
think of individuals as "consumers" to the degree that the choice of environmental policy
instrument affects them through its impact on the prices of goods and services; as
"environmentalists" to the degree that they are affected by the impact of instrument choice on
the level of environmental quality; and as "workers" to the degree that they are affected by
environmental policy through its impact on the demand for labor, and hence their wages.
3.2.2   Interest Groups
Because there are significant costs of lobbying and because the target of demand -- the
public policy -- is a public good,32 an individual and even a firm will receive relatively small
rewards for any direct lobbying efforts.  For individuals, the marginal costs of lobbying are
likely to outweigh the perceived marginal benefits over much of the relevant range of lobbying
activity, and individuals will undersupply lobbying, hoping instead to free ride on the efforts of
others. Although some large firms maintain offices in Washington, D.C. to facilitate direct
lobbying of the Congress, most of the demand for public policies from both firms and
individuals is transmitted through organized interest groups.
The free-riding problem that stands in the way of individual lobbying efforts can also be
a significant obstacle to the formation of interest groups (Olson 1965).  For an interest group
                                               
31 The maximized utility function is the individual's indirect utility function.  By Roy's Identity, we know that
the demand functions are downward sloping, as long as the utility function has the usual properties.  It is
possible that over a certain region the demand function will be increasing.  For example, a unit of support for
an instrument will be virtually worthless at very low levels of support, since adoption of that instrument will be
extremely unlikely.  We assume, however, that the demand function is decreasing over the politically relevant
range, in which adoption of the instrument is a realistic possibility.  It might be argued that if a legislature was
composed of a single legislator and there was perfect information, demand functions for political support
would (in the case of support relevant for voting) be a step function with a single step:  interest groups would
have no willingness-to-pay below some level of (adequate) support, and no willingness-to-pay above a sufficient
level of support.  But in a multi-member body, more support from individual legislators can always be worth
something, and if there is uncertainty about how much support is sufficient, the demand function is likely to be
downward sloping over at least some range.
32 Regulation may not always be nonexclusive.  Loopholes, narrowly-applying clauses in statutes, and
bureaucratic exemptions can all afford special treatment for some firms or narrowly defined categories of
consumers.  This possibility may provide enough incentive for some individual firms to lobby.-14- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
to organize, it must find a way to overcome the free-riding problem:  it must offer its members
enough benefits to make the costs of membership worthwhile.  For a citizen group, such as an
environmental advocacy organization, these benefits are likely to include:  "material
incentives," (Wilson 1973)  such as newsletters, workshops, or gifts; "solidarity incentives,"
essentially the benefits derived from social interaction; and "purposive incentives," the personal
satisfaction derived from membership in an organization whose activities one supports
(Rothenberg 1992).
Among citizen groups, taxpayer and consumer organizations may face greater free-
riding problems than environmental groups:  their lobbying actions are likely to have an even
wider range of potential beneficiaries; they may be able to offer fewer material incentives; and
they lack the compelling moral mission that may drive the purposive incentives motivating
members of environmental groups.  Of course, labor unions are able to overcome free-riding
problems through mandatory dues payments (Olson 1965; Wilson 1973).  To the extent that
these funds are used for lobbying efforts, we might expect unions to be especially well-
represented in the political arena.  But since unions dedicate most of their campaign
contributions to securing favorable labor policy, unions as a group have only rarely been
influential (or even active) in environmental policy debates.
In order to overcome their own set of free-rider problems, trade associations can offer a
range of benefits to their members that nonmembers do not enjoy, including:  influence over
policy goals; information on policy developments; reports on economic trends; and participation
in an annual convention (Olson 1965).  Compared with citizen groups, trade associations may
have significant advantages in overcoming free-riding:  they are usually smaller, making the
contributions of each member more significant; and even substantial annual dues may be
negligible costs for member firms (Wilson 1973).  Hence, we might expect that private industry
interests will be over-represented in the political process relative to citizen groups.
Interest groups do not simply aggregate the political demands of their members.
Indeed, an interest groups' utility maximization problem may diverge significantly from those
of its members as a result of a principal-agent problem: the members (and donors) are
principals who contract with their agent -- the interest group (or, more precisely, its
professional staff) -- to represent their views to the legislature.33  As in many such contractual
                                               
33 In the typical principal-agent relationship, the principals (in this case, the firms) know their own interests and
wish to ensure that the agent (here the trade association) acts in accordance with those interests.  It is conceivable,
however, that interest group staff may be leading the charge for policy changes that will benefit member firms,
while those firms remain largely ignorant about the policy issues at stake (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963).The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -15-
relationships, the output exerted by the agents may not be directly observable or controllable
by the principal.  The principal-agent problem is probably far more serious for environmental
advocacy groups than for private industry trade associations.34
Principal-agent slack between what the members want and what the interest group
actually does arises because the organization's staff has its own self interests.  A trade
association, for example, may not only want to maximize the profits of its member firms; it
may also seek to expand its membership or to increase revenue from member dues.  Similarly,
the objective function of an environmental group may include not only the level of
environmental quality, but also factors such as membership size, budget, and reputation among
various constituencies that affect the organization's health and viability.35
In seeking to secure as much support as possible in the legislature for its preferred
outcome, an interest group must decide how to allocate its scarce resources.  The total benefits
to an interest group of the legislature's support for an instrument rise with the degree of support
offered, but there are decreasing marginal returns.  As in the case of individuals and firms, a unit
increase in support when the legislature is already very favorably disposed to one's position is
worth less than a unit increase in support by a lukewarm or previously unsupportive legislature.
This characteristic produces a downward-sloping demand function: an interest group's marginal
willingness-to-pay for support decreases as the legislature's total support increases.36
3.3   Origins of Supply of Environmental Policy Instruments
We consider a legislator who derives utility from a constellation of factors made
possible by being a legislator: making public policy, doing good things for the country or for
her district, satisfying ideological beliefs, having prestige and the perquisites of office, and so
                                               
34 An environmental organization may have a hundred thousand members or more scattered across the
country, paying scant attention to the operational priorities of the organization (let alone the details of its day-
by-day activities).  Trade associations, on the other hand, may be dominated by a large producer, with an
incentive to monitor the association's activities; and their boards of directors may be made up of executives
from member firms.  Moreover, trade associations have many fewer members, and therefore the stake of each in
the organization is greater, and monitoring is more likely to be worthwhile.  On the other hand, trade
associations have their own set of problems.  Among these are the possible necessity of obtaining an expression
of consensus from member firms prior to undertaking specific lobbying efforts.
35 Lowry (1993) treats the agency problem in environmental groups extensively.  He argues that because
members and patrons cannot observe the outputs or effort of their agents directly, they must instead make
funding and membership decisions based on a group's inputs: its expenditures on lobbying, member materials,
advertising, and fund raising.
36 Up to this point, we have examined lobbying activities of interest groups exclusively in terms of their
demand-side effects.  It can also be argued that some such activities are intended to and may succeed in shifting
legislators' supply functions.  We examine this possibility below.-16- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
on.  To continue getting utility from these factors, the legislator must be reelected.  We assume
that legislators seek to maximize their expected utility.  In choosing a policy position (level of
support for a proposed instrument), therefore, the legislator takes into account the effort
required to provide that support, the inherent satisfaction she derives from providing that level
of support, and the effects her position will likely have on her chances of reelection.37
Thus, our framework allows for the legislator's supply function to consist of three
components:  (1) the opportunity cost of time (effort) required to provide a given degree of
support for a policy instrument; (2) the psychological cost of supporting an instrument despite
one's ideological beliefs (if supporting the instrument is consistent with one's ideological
beliefs, then this is a "negative cost," i.e. a benefit); and (3) the opportunity cost (in terms of
reduced probability of reelection) of supporting an instrument not favored by one's electoral
constituency (this is also a "negative cost" if supporting the instrument is consistent with one's
constituents' positions).
The first component emerges from the individual legislator's productivity in providing
support.  As indicated in Figure 2, the legislator's input is "effort"38 and the relevant output is
"effective support."  Some legislators are more efficient producers of effective support from a
given amount of effort than others for a host of reasons, including the size and effectiveness of
their staffs, their seniority in the legislature, and -- importantly -- their membership and
leadership on relevant committees.  By placing a value on the opportunity cost of time and
effort, we can derive an opportunity cost function (Figure 3), and from that, the related
marginal opportunity cost of effort, represented by the upward-sloping line emanating from the
origin in Figure 4.39
                                               
37 This notion of legislators' goals is consistent with Fenno's (1973, 1978) description of Congressmen as
having three basic objectives:   re-election, influence within the House, and good public policy.  In our
framework, "influence within the House" and "good public policy" are combined in "being a legislator."  If the
legislator wishes to continue to be a legislator in the future, she will also value reelection.
38 This includes the use of other resources, but may be thought of as being denominated in units of time.
39 In the face of the overwhelming claims on their time and resources -- both in Washington and in their home
districts -- a Congressman's time and effort carries a significant opportunity cost (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter
1963; Kingdon 1989; Fenno 1978).  Effort invested in providing support for one bill could have been spent
working on other legislation  that would satisfy ideological goals, reflect voters' objectives, and/or attract votes,
dollars, and other resources; or visiting the home district and supplying constituency services such as help
dealing with the bureaucracy (Denzau and Munger 1986, Grier and Munger 1993).  Note that the marginal cost
function is assumed in the figure to be linear, simply to keep the explication simple.The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -17-
Figure 2 is available from the authors.-18- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
Figure 3 is available from the authors.The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -19-
Figure 4 is available from the authors.-20- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
Next, we posit that a legislator derives disutility from acting inconsistently with her
ideology.  Thus, we introduce the psychological cost of supporting a policy that is inconsistent
with one's ideological beliefs.  As suggested above, this cost would be negative (a benefit) if
one were ideologically predisposed to favor the particular policy.  In either case, it is
conceivable that these marginal (psychological) costs might be increasing or decreasing (in
absolute value) with the degree of support, but for ease of presentation we portray this
marginal cost as constant in Figure 4.  In this case, the legislator's ideology has no effect on the
slope of the combined marginal cost function; rather, ideology shifts the function upwards (for
inconsistency with ideology) or downwards (for consistency with ideology).
Finally, we can consider the third component of the legislator's supply function:  the
opportunity cost corresponding to the reduced probability of reelection due to supporting an
instrument not favored by one's electoral constituency. This effect can be either direct in the
form of lost votes from constituents unhappy with the legislator's position, or indirect as a
result of the opposition of interest groups unhappy with the legislator's position, which through
protest and grassroots mobilization could affect the constituents' assessment of the legislator.40
Again, this is a "negative cost" if supporting the instrument is consistent with one's
constituents' positions.41  As with ideological costs, these marginal electoral opportunity costs
could be increasing or decreasing with the level of the legislator's support, but to keep things
simple we draw them as constant (and positive) in Figure 4.42
The overall (individual) marginal cost function -- the legislator's supply-of-support
function -- is simply the vertical summation of these three components:  opportunity costs of
effort, ideological costs, and constituency costs (Figure 4).  The amount of support for a policy
instrument that a legislator would supply at zero price, that is, in the absence of any contributions
helpful to advancing the member's goals, including her re-election, is represented in Figure 5 as
                                               
40 Congressmen tend to take into account the preferences of the people who voted for them, i.e. their
"supporting coalition" (Kingdon 1989) or their "reelection constituency" (Fenno 1978).  A conservative
legislator whose reelection constituency is anti-regulatory, for example, will not be affected by a minority group
of environmentalists calling for command-and-control regulation.
41 Departing from the preferences of constituents reduces the probability of the legislator's reelection.  This
reduced probability can be evaluated in terms of  the resources required to maintain a constant probability of
reelection.
42 In the figure, we represent both ideological costs and electoral costs as being positive; i.e., support for the
policy is essentially inconsistent both with the legislator's own ideology and her constituents' preferences.  It is
not inconceivable that these could be of opposite sign, but in a representative democracy, that would be the
exception, not the rule.  As stated by Fenno (1978, p. 142):  "'If your conscience and your district disagree too
often,' members like to say, 'you're in the wrong business.'"The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -21-
Figure 5 is available from the authors.-22- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
the "preferred point," the intersection of the supply function with the horizontal axis.  In this
framework, the legislator can be induced to offer greater degrees of support than this preferred
point by offers of "political compensation" that offset the legislator's opportunity costs arising
from such support.
Thus, the legislator has an upward-sloping marginal opportunity-cost or supply
function, beginning at her preferred degree of support along the horizontal axis.  The
intersection of the supply function with the horizontal axis can take place at either a positive or
a negative degree of support (see S1 and S3, respectively, in Figure 5).  A politician who is
strongly opposed to a given instrument because of a combination of her own ideology and her
constituents' preferences will have a supply function with a negative intercept on the horizontal
axis (and a positive intercept on the vertical axis).  For such a legislator, a positive, non-
marginal shadow price of political compensation is required for any positive degree of support
to be forthcoming (see point A in Figure 5).
A legislator's supply function is affected by several exogenous factors.  First, an
exogenous increase in the negative impact of a given instrument on a legislator's constituents
(for example, the construction in the legislator's district of a new factory that would have to
pay pollution taxes) would increase the legislator's opportunity costs of supporting that
instrument.  Conversely, an exogenous increase in the benefits of an instrument to the
legislator's constituents (for example, the expansion of a firm in the district that produced a
mandated abatement technology) would decrease the legislator's opportunity costs.
Second, the position of the legislator's political party is also relevant.  Parties supply
funds and organizational support in re-election campaigns.  Moreover, leadership posts in the
party offer opportunities for increased effectiveness in the legislature.  Obviously, parties are
likely to be more generous with legislators who are loyal.43
Third, the actions of other legislators will have a bearing on the costs of supplying
support because of the possibilities for vote trading.  For example, one legislator may care a
great deal about the level of environmental protection chosen, while having only a slight
preference for standards over taxes; another legislator may care less about the exact level but
have a strong preference for taxes over standards, perhaps because of her own market-oriented
ideology.  In a logroll, both legislators could gain from vote trading, and such a logroll would
affect both legislators' costs of supplying support for a given instrument.
                                               
43 Party leaders may conceivably also become effective demanders for policy instrument support by offering
various resources to legislators in exchange for support, in which case the parties are essentially functioning as
interest groups.The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -23-
Fourth and finally, it is both the intent and the consequence of some lobbying activities
to shift legislators' supply functions.  In other words, in addition to being the primary
demanders for alternative forms of regulation, organized interest groups can also play a role in
determining the position and shape of legislators' supply functions.  Lobbyists might attempt
to:  affect a legislator's ideologically-based perception of the merits of a proposed policy
instrument (Kingdon 1989); affect a legislator's perceptions of her constituents' policy
preferences (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994); and/or affect a legislator's effort-support
production function through, for example, provision of information or technical support
(Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963).
3.4   Formation of Equilibria and Legislative Outcomes
Up to this point, we have focused on the origins of supply and demand for a single
policy instrument.  In many contexts, there will be a set of possible instruments considered for
achieving a given policy goal:  for example, a standard, tax, and a system of tradeable permits.
In addition, there will exist the possibility of doing nothing, i.e. maintaining the status quo.
Hence if N alternative instruments are under consideration, then there will be N+1 possible
choices of action.44 We view each option as defining a "political market" for effective
support.45  On the demand side, each policy instrument may have an associated set of interest
groups seeking to secure support for it.  On the supply side, each policy instrument gives rise
to its own set of legislator supply functions.  A single legislator may be more efficient at
producing support for one instrument than for another; she may have different ideological
attitudes towards different instruments; and the preferences of her reelection constituency may
vary across instruments, as well.
The legislative outcome is the choice of one of the N+1 alternatives arising from the
interactions of interest groups' demands for and legislators' supplies of support for alternative
instruments.  The degree of aggregate support for each instrument results from an equilibrium
established in the legislature, and the outcome in the legislature favors the policy instrument
with the greatest degree of total support.
In the following sections, we examine the component parts of this process.  We first
consider the nature of the aggregation of demand for a policy instrument across interested
                                               
44 We simply take the choice set of instruments as given.  Important questions remain regarding how it is
determined, but these are beyond the scope of this paper.
45 An interest group can demand and a legislator can supply support for more than one instrument.  Although
this may at first seem counterintuitive, recall that each legislator's supply function for a given instrument may
include the possibility of opposition.-24- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
individuals and groups, and the aggregation of supplies of support for a policy instrument
across members of the legislature.  Then, we consider the formation of equilibria in the
legislature for alternative policy instruments and the consequent choice of political outcome.
Finally, we discuss alternative approaches to modeling this political market.
3.4.1   Aggregation of Demand for Policy Instrument Support
Typically, more than one interest group will be pressing for support from the legislature.
How is such interest group demand to be aggregated?  In the classic model associated with
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), the "winner takes all": the highest bidder wins, and gains
control over regulation.  In Becker's (1983) model, competing interest groups participate in a
zero-sum game along a single dimension: one group is taxed, the other subsidized, and each
tries to improve its lot at the expense of the other.  In an actual legislature, interest groups may
be opposed to one another or aligned in support of the same instrument.
The most obvious approach for aggregating interest-group demand functions might be
simply to sum, at each level of willingness-to-pay, the degrees of support that each group
demands at that price.  Such demand aggregation makes sense for private goods, but the
support the legislature provides is essentially a public good.  Hence, an efficient approach
might involve taking a given level of support and summing up what each interest group is
(marginally) willing to pay for that degree of support; that is, vertical summation rather than
horizontal summation of individual demands.  But such an (efficient) approach is unlikely to
reflect positive reality, as long as free-rider problems among interest groups exist.  Therefore,
the aggregate demand thus calculated represents the upper bound of actual aggregate demand
-- that is, the demand which would be experienced in the absence of free riding.
3.4.2   Aggregation of Supply of Policy Instrument Options
Since, in this framework, the degree of support by individual legislators is denominated
in terms of homogenous units of "effective support," where the differences among legislators
are incorporated in the production functions that underlie these individual marginal opportunity
cost of effort functions (as well as the individual marginal ideology and electoral cost
functions), the appropriate aggregation to derive the supply function for the legislature is the
horizontal summation of the supply functions of individual legislators.  As we noted above,
some legislators' supply functions may extend to the left of the vertical axis (for example, S3 in
Figure 5), corresponding to opposition to the instrument in question.  Therefore, when the
individual legislator supply functions are horizontally added, the aggregate supply function for
the legislature represents the relevant net supply of support.  Like the supply function for anThe Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -25-
individual legislator, the aggregate function for some instruments may intersect the vertical axis
at a positive price.
3.4.3   Equilibrium Support in the Legislature for a Policy Instrument
We treat the legislature as operating as if it were a competitive market for the support
for policy instruments.  Given the homogeneity of the commodity that is demanded and
supplied, the number of members in the two houses of Congress, and the number of active
interest groups, this seems like a reasonable first approximation.  Thus, the equilibrium,
aggregate level of "effective support" that is provided for the policy instrument is that level for
which aggregate supply equals aggregate demand (Q* in Figure 6).  This level is associated
with a shadow price (P in Figure 6) representing the aggregate marginal willingness to pay for
support in the legislature's equilibrium.
There are two cases of interest in which the aggregate supply and demand functions
will not intersect in the politically relevant positive orthant.  One is the case in which the
demand function intersects the horizontal axis to the left of the legislature's "aggregate
preferred point" (see the gap between points B and EA in Figure 7); that is, the maximum
support demanded in the aggregate by interest groups (at zero price) is less than the legislature
would provide on its own.  In this case of "excess supply," it is reasonable to assume that the
legislature will provide support at its preferred point (EA).  Given the likelihood of free-riding
among interest groups, it would not be surprising if in certain instances the aggregate demand
by interest groups fell short of the support a strongly committed legislature was willing to
provide absent any lobbying.  In this case the competitive equilibrium price is zero, and so each
legislator provides support at her own preferred point.
The second special case of interest might arise when a legislature so strongly opposes
an policy that its upward-sloping aggregate supply function intersects the vertical axis at a
positive price (point C in Figure 7).  In this case, the supply function could conceivably lie
entirely above the interest groups' aggregate demand function.  The political price that such a
legislature would require for a positive degree of support is simply greater than the interest
groups' overall reservation price for obtaining such support (point D in Figure 7).
In this competitive political market framework, an individual legislator will tend to supply
support for a particular policy instrument up to the point where her marginal opportunity costs of
doing so are equivalent to the infinitely elastic demand for support she faces from interest
groups, represented by the horizontal line through the point P in Figure 5 (derived from the-26- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
Figure 6 is available from the authors.The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -27-
Figure 7 is available from the authors.-28- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
equilibrium in Figure 6).  Thus, a set of legislators with supply functions represented by S1, S2,
and S3 (Figure 5), would provide effective support of Q1, Q2, and Q3, respectively.
The legislator with supply function S3 provides a negative level of support, i.e.
opposition.  An interest group might benefit from contributing to this legislator in the hope of
reducing her degree of active opposition,46 just as it can benefit by increasing the support of a
"friendly" legislator.  It would take a level of demand (and political compensation) equivalent
to point A in Figure 5 to move this same legislator to a position of inaction or indifference.
On the other hand, legislators such as those represented by S1 and S2 in Figure 5
derive benefits (negative costs) from supporting an instrument, no matter what the position of
relevant interest groups.  Not surprisingly, such friendly legislators end up supplying even
greater levels of support in response to interest group demand.
3.4.4   Legislative Outcomes
How do individual levels of support for policy instruments translate into policy
outcomes?  If our interest is in aggregate quantity of support (as defined), then total support is
simply equal to the sum of the individual levels of equilibrium support, which is identical to the
original market equilibrium.  On the other hand, institutional processes that translate individual
levels of support into a collective decision (for example, various kinds of voting mechanisms)
may involve very different sorts of aggregation.  In general, institutional features of the
legislature will influence the nature of the appropriate aggregation.
First, the committee structure of Congress (especially in the House of Representatives)
gives different legislators widely different levels of influence over policy.47  Thus, legislators
vary greatly in the effectiveness of the support they can supply for a given instrument.  But in
our framework, with its focus on degrees of effective support, this reality is already
                                               
46 Hall and Wayman (1990) examine legislator participation in committees, and argue that interest groups give
contributions to "hostile" legislators in order to reduce their participation, i.e. their opposition.
47 Norms of deference, backed up by repeated interactions and the threat of retaliation, give members of
committees and subcommittees significant influence over policies under their jurisdiction (Shepsle and
Weingast 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988).  Agenda-setting or "gate keeping" powers give committees the
right to send bills to the floor or table them in committee.  Standing committees are also heavily represented on
the conference committees that are established to reconcile differences between the chambers before final
passage.  Power is particularly concentrated in the hands of committee chairs, who hold sway over the
committee's agenda and the bills it reports to the floor.  Given the importance of committee composition, policy
outcomes may differ markedly from the preferences of the legislature as a whole; with low committee turnover,
and given the importance of seniority, the status quo may persist long after support in the full legislature has
ebbed (Shepsle and Weingast 1984).The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -29-
incorporated (through the political support production functions) and has no effect on the
appropriate aggregation; it remains one of simple summation of individual equilibria.
Second, legislative outcomes are affected by voting rules.  The number of votes
necessary for passage, taking into account the veto power of the executive, determines the
level and distribution of support needed to pass a bill.48  Furthermore, the order of voting on
amendments and the nature of the final vote also affect the outcome.49  This brings us to the
important issue of how support is translated into votes.  Whereas our "degree of support" is a
continuous variable, it may produce a binary variable, a vote.  Any empirical implementation of
this framework would need to address the linkage.50  For our purposes, however, we can
focus on the reality that -- in general -- the policy instrument chosen will be the alternative that
has garnered the greatest aggregate support.
3.4.5   Alternative Equilibrium Frameworks
Other conceptual frameworks of this political market can certainly be developed.  One
interesting alternative approach would be to give greater emphasis to the differences that exist
among individual legislators in terms of the nature of support they can provide.  Thus, rather
than quantifying support in terms of perfectly homogenous units of "effective support," we
could recognize that the "uniqueness" of support from any single legislator (particularly from
powerful members of the legislature) may be interpreted as leading to a set of monopoly
political markets, rather than a single competitive political market.
Thus, at one extreme, if each member of the legislature is a monopoly supplier of her
unique type of support and thus faces a downward-sloping demand for her support, we have a
set of monopoly equilibria, one for each member of the legislature, with each member equating
her marginal cost (individual supply function) with the "marginal revenue" function associated
with the policy demands she faces, and thus determining her equilibrium (and utility-
maximizing) level of support.
                                               
48 In the U.S. Congress, a bill needs a bare majority in the House of Representatives, but may have to clear a
higher hurdle in the Senate to bring closure to debate.  If the President vetoes the bill, of course, two-thirds
majorities in both houses are required to enact legislation.
49 In the Congress, a bill, as modified by successful amendments, is considered opposite the status quo in the
final vote.  This arrangement favors the status quo and requires that each bill be compared ultimately with the
status quo rather than with other alternatives.
50 For example, discrete-choice econometric models that have as their theoretical basis the existence of an
unobserved latent variable are an obvious candidate.-30- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
This extreme case of multiple monopoly suppliers seems to be a less reasonable
approximation of political reality than the perfectly competitive case.  But it does illustrate the
possibility of developing alternative models of imperfect competition that may do a better job
of capturing important characteristics of these political markets.  Various models of
cooperative and noncooperative oligopoly may capture significant elements of legislative
relationships.51  We leave such explorations for future efforts.  Instead, for purposes of
developing a conceptual framework within which we can organize and synthesize existing
political economy theories, we proceed with the basic competitive framework.
4.   DEMAND  FOR  ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY  INSTRUMENTS
Demand-side explanations for the choice among environmental policy instruments can
be separated into four sectors of regulatory demand: firms, environmentalists, consumers, and
labor.
4.1   Firms
Firms will tend to demand the policy instruments that promise the highest profits (or
the least losses) from regulation.  While all environmental regulation imposes costs of
compliance on firms, not all instruments impose the same costs to achieve a given regulatory
goal.  Positive political economy explanations of firm demand for environmental regulation can
be divided into three principal categories: firm preferences for one instrument over another can
arise from lower aggregate costs of compliance to industry as a whole; the presence of rents
and entry barriers; and differential costs of compliance across firms in a given industry.52
4.1.1   Lower Aggregate Costs to an Industry as a Whole
All else being equal, firms will naturally tend to prefer regulatory instruments that have
lower aggregate costs for the industry as a whole.  Because market-based approaches are likely
to be more cost-effective than command-and-control instruments, this thinking would suggest
                                               
51 For example, the respective roles played by committee chairs and members may be modeled as a monopolist
operating in the context of a competitive fringe.
52 There are other plausible explanations for firms' preferences.  Firms may simply support the continuation of
the status quo, which is generally the command-and-control approach, because replacing familiar policies with
new instruments can mean that existing expertise within firms becomes less valued (Kelman 1981, Stewart
1996).  For example, lobbyists -- the agents in a principal-agent relationship -- may be expected to rationally
resist the dissipation of their human capital (Hahn and Stavins 1991).  It has also been suggested that market-
based instruments may be opposed simply because they are not well understood (Kelman 1981, Welch 1983),
and there is at least anecdotal evidence that this has been the case.  Such lack of understanding can also affect
the supply side, and we discuss this later.The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -31-
that private industry, as a whole, would be more supportive of market-based approaches in
general.  However, there is a crucial distinction between the aggregate costs for society and
aggregate costs for private industry.  Cost-effective instruments, by definition, minimize costs
to society; but they vary in the proportion of that cost they place on polluters.  The use of
market-based instruments, in general, does not guarantee that firms' compliance costs will be
less than under command-and-control.
We can expect that firms will oppose regulatory instruments that shift a greater cost
burden onto industry.  For example, the virtually unanimous opposition by private industry to
pollution taxes can be explained by under such schemes firms pay not only their private costs of
compliance, but also the costs of tax payments to the government for all residual emissions.53
Similarly, under tradeable permit schemes, firms bear equivalent costs if the initial distribution of
the permits is by means of an auction.  In contrast, under a tradeable permit scheme with
grandfathered permits, existing firms do not bear any cost for their residual emissions.54
These arguments suggest that private industry, as a whole, will prefer grandfathered
permits and standards to other instruments.  Grandfathered permits are cost-effective and
minimize the burden placed on industry -- at least on existing firms.  Emissions standards may
not fare as well on the total-cost criterion, but are likely to be preferred by firms to auctioned
permits or taxes.
4.1.2   Generation of Rents and Erection of Entry Barriers
Certain types of regulations can actually augment firms' profits through the generation of
rents and the erection of entry barriers.  In general, firms will earn rents if a regulatory
instrument drives price above average cost.  Consider the simple case of a command-and-
control standard that sets an allowable level of aggregate pollution for each firm, where firms
can meet the standard only by reducing their output (Buchanan and Tullock 1975).  If the
industry is initially made up of many identical firms, each facing an identical demand, with
classical average and marginal cost functions, in the absence of regulation each firm will
produce at the intersection of its marginal and average cost curves, and make zero profits.  The
environmental standard has the effect of reducing total production and therefore raising price
along the aggregate demand curve.  If the environmental restriction is not exceptionally severe,
                                               
53 On this point, see Kelman 1981; Crandall 1983; Hahn and Noll 1990; and Arnold 1995.  Actually, firms
pay less than the full amount of the tax; a share is passed on to consumers.
54 Grandfathering distributes the rents from permits to firms that participate in the initial allocation (Dewees
1983), in contrast with an auction (Yohe 1976).-32- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
the new price will be above average cost for all firms.  Firms, therefore, earn rent: the difference
between the price they receive for their product and their cost of production.  If entry is
prohibited, existing firms will continue earning rents into the future; even if not, the rents will
last until enough new firms enter to reestablish competitive equilibrium at the new price.  Hence,
in this very simple model, firms may prefer standards to no regulation at all, and firms will prefer
standards to taxes, since a tax is a charge for a resource that otherwise is free.55
Firms, however, are not limited to the single response of cutting output.  They can also
reduce emissions by adopting a new technology or changing their input mix.  In this more
general and realistic scenario, depending on the stringency of the standards and other factors,
command-and-control standards can still have the effect of providing rents to regulated firms
(Maloney and McCormick 1982).  Here, too, under certain conditions, firms may prefer
command-and-control standards to no regulation at all.56
It is important to note that the enhanced industry profitability that results from rents
will be sustainable over the long term only in the presence of entry restrictions.  Thus, firms
regulated by a rent-generating instrument, such as command-and-control standards, will benefit
if that instrument is linked to a mechanism that imposes barriers to entry.  In theory, such a
mechanism might prohibit new entry outright, but a more politically feasible approach would
impose higher costs on new entrants (Stigler 1971, Rasmusen and Zupan 1991).
This body of theory helps explain why private firms (and their trade associations) may
have strong demands for command-and-control standards, which create rents, and especially
for considerably more stringent command-and-control standards for new sources, which create
barriers to entry.57  The theory thereby provides the beginnings of an explanation for the
                                               
55 Even if the restriction is severe enough to impose losses on firms, they will prefer standards to taxes, which
impose new costs.  In the long run, under a tax scheme, firms will exit the industry until a new zero-profit
equilibrium is reached; but in the short term, firms will lose money.  The tax reduces each firm's present value of
income, whether it remains in the industry or exits.  Firms will therefore oppose the introduction of pollution taxes.
56 Pollution restrictions raise both the average and marginal cost curves.  Each firm will produce at the level
where restricted marginal cost intersects the per-firm demand curve.  If the minimum average cost under
regulation is to the left of this point, the price (marginal cost) will exceed average cost, and firms will earn
rents.  Maloney and McCormick (1982) identified three conditions that are sufficient for regulation to enhance
producer profits:  (1) output under regulation corresponds to some cost-minimizing level of output in the
absence of regulation; (2) pollution increases with output; and (3) average costs increase more at higher levels
of output under regulation.  The necessary and sufficient condition for higher profits is that the intersection of
average and marginal cost under regulation lie to the left of the firm's demand curve.
57 Other barriers to entry result, for example, from the permitting requirements for new sources under the
prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) and non-attainment programs under the Clean Air Act, as well as
by non-attainment programs' offset requirements for new sources.  The significance in a positive sense of
scarcity rents as a major explanation for the prevalence of particular forms of environmental regulation hasThe Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -33-
prevalence of such instruments in U.S. environmental laws.  Further, theory indicates that
under certain conditions the regulated industry will be better off under such a scheme than
under no regulation.
Although the theoretical arguments are strong, there are no conclusive empirical
validations of these demand-side propositions.  Direct empirical tests of firm demand for
instruments -- such as analyses of resources devoted to lobbying for instruments as a function
of firms' stakes in an issue -- are virtually nonexistent.  Instead, most empirical work in this
area simply seeks to measure the benefits an industry receives under regulation.  Thus, it is not
instrument demand that is examined, but an underlying premise for such demand.  Maloney and
McCormick (1982) employed financial market event analysis in two regulatory cases to test
whether the value of regulated firms, as measured by stock market prices, was positively
affected by the announcement of regulation, as the economic theory of regulation would
suggest.   They found that cotton-dust standards promulgated by the U.S. Occupational,
Safety, and Health Administration (OSHA) raised the asset value of cotton producers,
consistent with the notion that regulation increased firms' profits by creating rents.  But a more
comprehensive study by Hughes, Magat, and Ricks (1986) reached the opposite conclusion.
This discussion also provides a positive political economy explanation for why market-
based instruments have virtually always taken the form of grandfathered tradeable permits, or
at least of why private firms should be expected to have strong demands for this means of
permit allocation.  In tradeable permit schemes, grandfathering: (1) conveys scarcity rents to
firms, since existing polluters are granted valuable economic resources for free; and
(2) provides entry barriers, in that new entrants must purchase permits from existing holders.
Hahn and McGartland (1989) provide anecdotal evidence for rent-seeking in the decision
making process over EPA's implementation of the Montreal Protocol restricting the use and
production of CFCs.  They argue that a rent-seeking model explains the positions of large
producers, such as DuPont, that supported grandfathered tradeable permits and opposed other
implementation schemes, including an auction proposal.
The preceding discussion does not provide a compelling explanation for the prevalence
of command-and-control standards over grandfathered tradeable permits.  In principle, either
                                                
important normative implications, as well.  This is because in the presence of pre-existing tax distortions, the
distribution of these rents can have efficiency implications (Fullerton and Metcalf 1996).  It is ironic that
precisely that mechanism that facilitates political acceptance of some environmental policies (transmission of
scarcity rents to the regulated sector) may also undo some or all of the welfare gains that would have been
forthcoming.-34- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
instrument could provide sustainable rents to existing firms.  We must search elsewhere for
positive political economy explanations of this phenomenon.
4.1.3   Differential Costs Across Firms in an Industry
A different explanation for the landscape of environmental policy instruments arises
from the existence of differential costs of environmental compliance across firms.  Because of
this heterogeneity, a firm may support policy instruments that impose costs on it, as long as
those costs affect it less than the industry average and thus give it a competitive advantage
(Leone and Jackson 1981, Oster 1982).  For example, firms with large refineries for which lead
reduction involved relatively low costs were supportive of the tradeable permit system by
which the leaded content of gasoline was reduced in the 1980's (Kerr and Maré 1995), whereas
firms with smaller refineries were vehemently opposed.58  Similarly, the largest producers of
chloroflourocarbons (CFC's) -- DuPont and Imperial Chemical Industries -- supported a ban on
CFC's in large part because they were best able to develop substitutes (Oye and Maxwell
1995).  Other empirical work, however, has cast doubt on the proposition that firms advocate
instruments based on inter-industry or intra-industry transfers.  Leone and Jackson (1981)
found that legislators with a paper producer in their districts voted against water pollution
control legislation, regardless of whether the producer stood to gain or lose relative to its
competitors.59
Another form of cost differential arises as a result of the erection of barriers to entry.  It
is important to distinguish here between the entry of new firms and the expansion of existing
firms.  The entry barriers of environmental regulation generally apply to both situations.  Thus,
within an industry, firms with no plans to expand would derive a greater benefit from entry
barriers, which could discourage further growth by their competitors.
Conversely, firms with ambitious expansion plans relative to their existing operations
would benefit from weaker barriers.  Such firms would also try to structure barriers in a
manner that gave them an advantage relative to newcomers.  For example, the "bubble"
                                               
58 The small refineries' opposition is discussed in the case they brought to stop or delay the program: Small
Refiner Lead Phasedown Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  Another example of such intra-
industry differentials, and the resulting splintering of lobbying strategy, occurred when the National Coal
Association (NCA) divided over the question of scrubber requirements in clean air legislation.  A universal
scrubber requirement would have preserved demand for eastern coal, which had higher sulfur content than its
cleaner western competition.  The NCA split between eastern and western coal producers and stayed out of the
debates leading up to the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments (Ackerman and Hassler 1981).
59 These authors note that firms may oppose regulation out of uncertainty concerning how the legislation will
be implemented, since cost predictions depend on subsequent rule making decisions by administrative agencies.The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -35-
program of the Clean Air Act makes these barriers less onerous for existing firms because they
can engage in intra-firm emissions trading.60   Under this program, a firm can reduce the
emissions of an existing source by an amount at least equal to the emissions of the new source,
instead of having to take the more costly step of meeting the command-and-control standard
otherwise applicable to new sources.61  The Clean Air Act's "netting" policies, which allow
intra-firm trading across time periods, also make expansion by an incumbent easier than entry
by a new firm.
The mechanism for allocating tradeable permits might also produce different winners
and losers within an industry.  Under a grandfathering scheme that allocated permits on the
basis of emissions at the time of establishment of the tradeable permit scheme, firms that
invested in pollution abatement prior to regulation stand to lose, relative to their more heavily
polluting competitors (Hahn and Noll 1990).62  Such firms might conceivably prefer the
allocation of permits by means of an initial auction.63
4.2   Environmental Organizations
As noted above, we anticipate that the utility of an environmental advocacy group will
be affected by both the organization's well-being and the level of environmental quality.  First,
organizational well-being may be measured partly by budgetary resources, which are a function
of donor contributions.  This financial concern can affect an organization's demand for specific
policy instruments if such support attracts members, persuades donors to make contributions,
or, more broadly, increases the visibility and prestige of the organization.  Hence, an
                                               
60 The bubble program typically permits only geographically contiguous trades.  Thus, even among existing
firms with expansion plans, the benefits of the program depend on where the expansion is contemplated.
61 A general system of tradeable permits would eliminate this advantage.
62 Also, small firms might be particularly supportive of grandfathering out of concern that auctions will be
dominated by larger players (Hahn and McGartland 1989).  Similarly, since the transition to a grandfathered-
permits system is likely to involve less uncertainty than an auction, it might receive disproportionate support
from risk-averse firms.
63 Some supporting evidence is provided by the establishment of a market in takeoff and landing slots at the
nation's busiest airports.  Since 1968, peak-hour takeoffs and landings have been restricted at LaGuardia, John
F. Kennedy, O'Hare, and Washington National Airports.  Until 1986, these  slots" were allocated by a
scheduling committee composed of the airlines using a given airport.  In that year, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) replaced the committee-allocation system with a system of grandfathered tradeable
permits.  In the months before the proposal was to go into effect, Congress held hearings and considered
whether to overrule the FAA.  At the hearings, large airlines, which already held most of the slots, supported
grandfathering.  In contrast, upstart airlines with few slots that were looking to expand -- such as People's
Express, Republic and Western -- vigorously opposed grandfathering, calling for a large percentage of existing
slots to be auctioned or distributed by lottery.  See:  U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 1986.-36- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
organization's demand for a given policy instrument is likely to be affected (ceteris paribus) by
several factors: the likelihood that the instrument will be chosen by policy makers;64 the degree
to which the organization can be clearly identified with supporting the instrument; the
magnitude of potential funding gains due to distinguishing itself from other environmental
groups; and the ability to offer donors and members a compelling argument, on environmental-
quality grounds, in support of the instrument.
A prominent example is provided by the Environmental Defense Fund's (EDF)
enthusiastic and effective support of the SO2 allowance trading system adopted as part of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.  With the Bush Administration eager to back up the
President's claim of being "the environmental President," and with key senior staff in the
Administration having strong predispositions to the use of market-based approaches, the
proposal had a chance of succeeding.  EDF had already become a champion of market-based
approaches to environmental protection in other, less nationally prominent, domains.  Now it
faced an opportunity to strengthen that position and solidify its reputation as a pragmatic
environmental organization willing to adopt new strategies involving less confrontation with
private industry.  By supporting tradeable permits, EDF could seize a market niche in the
environmental movement, distinguishing itself further from other groups.  Importantly, EDF
was able to make a powerful argument for tradeable permits on environmental, as opposed to
economic, grounds: the use of a cost-effective instrument would make it politically possible to
achieve greater reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions than would otherwise be the case.
EDF is an outlier in this realm.  Most environmental advocacy groups have been
relatively hostile towards market-based instruments.  This should not be terribly surprising.
Because of their interest in strengthening environmental protection, environmental
organizations might be expected to prefer command-and-control approaches to market-based
schemes for three reasons.  The first reason is philosophical:  environmentalists have portrayed
pollution taxes and tradeable permits as "licenses to pollute" (Kelman 1981),65 and they have
voiced concerns that damages from pollution -- to human health and to ecological well-being --
                                               
64 We need to distinguish here between strategic and tactical decisions by advocacy groups.  The strategic
decision by an environmental organization to express demand for a policy instrument and get it on the agenda
for consideration is probably positively related to perceived probability of success; but the tactical decision to
allocate resources (express demands) for an instrument already on the agenda may well be negatively related to
probability of success.
65 This criticism overlooks the fact that under conventional command-and-control regulations, firms receive
these same licenses to pollute for free (Hahn and Stavins 1991).The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -37-
are difficult or impossible to quantify and monetize, and thus cannot be summed up in a
marginal damage function or captured by a Pigouvian tax rate (Kelman 1981).
Second, environmental organizations may oppose market-based schemes on strategic
grounds.  Once implemented, permit levels and tax rates may be more difficult to alter than
command-and-control standards.  If permits are given the status of "property rights," an
attempt to reduce pollution levels in the future may meet with "takings" claims and demands
for government compensation (Hahn and Noll 1990).  This concern, however, can be alleviated
by an explicit statutory provision (like that contained in the acid rain provisions of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990) stating that permits do not represent property rights, or by
"sunset" provisions that specify a particular period of time during which a permit is valid.
Likewise in the case of pollution taxes, if increased tax rates become desirable in
response to new information about a pollutant or about the response of firms to the existing
taxes, adjustment may be unlikely because raising tax rates is politically difficult.  Furthermore,
taxes have long been treated as "political footballs" in the United States (as in the recent case
of calls to reduce gasoline taxes).  Hence, environmental organizations might oppose pollution
taxes out of fear that they would be reduced or eliminated over time.  A related strategic
reason for why environmentalists might oppose the use of tax instruments is that a shift from
command-and-control to tax-based environmental regulation would shift authority from
environment committees in the Congress, frequently dominated by pro-environment legislators,
to tax-writing committees, which are generally more conservative (Kelman 1981).
These strategic arguments refer, for the most part, to pollution taxes, not to market-
based instruments in general.  Indeed, one reason environmental groups, such as EDF, have
endorsed the tradeable permits approach is that it promises the cost savings of taxes, without
the drawbacks that environmentalists associate with tax instruments.
Third, environmental organizations may object to decentralized instruments on
technical grounds.  Although market-based instruments are theoretically superior in terms of
cost effectiveness, problems may arise in translating theory into practice (Hahn and Axtell
1994).  For example, an emission tax or tradeable permit scheme can lead to localized "hot
spots" with relatively high levels of ambient pollution.  While this problem can be addressed, in
theory, through the use of permits or charge systems that are denominated in units of
environmental degradation (Revesz 1996), the design of such systems might be perceived as
excessively cumbersome.-38- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
4.3   Labor
Since unions seek to protect jobs, they might be expected to oppose instruments likely
to lead to plant closings or other large industrial dislocations.  Under a tradeable permit
scheme, for example, firms might close their factories in heavily polluted areas, sell permits,
and relocate to less polluted areas (Hahn and Noll 1990).  In contrast, command-and-control
standards have generally been tailored to protect aging plants.  The threat of factory
dislocation is a likely explanation of support from northern, urban members of Congress for the
"prevention of significant deterioration" (PSD) policy in clean air regulation, which has
discouraged movement of industry out of urban areas in the northeast, into high-quality air
sheds in the South and West (Crandall 1983, Pashigian 1985).  Depending on the tradeoffs
between job creation effects and job preservation effects, labor might support stricter
command-and-control standards for new sources.
There are other examples of labor concern over the choice of environmental policy
instruments.  In the 1977 debates over amendments to the Clean Air Act, eastern coal miners'
unions fought to include a command-and-control standard that effectively required scrubbing,
thereby seeking to ensure continued reliance on cheap, high-sulfur coal from the east, over
cleaner western coal (Ackerman and Hassler 1981).  Likewise, in the debates over the SO2
allowance trading system in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, the United Mine
Workers opposed the system because it would create incentives for the use of low-sulfur coal
from largely non-unionized mines in Wyoming's Powder River Basin over high-sulfur coal from
eastern, unionized mines.
4.4   Consumers
Because of obstacles to organizing, arising from free-rider and limited-information
problems, consumer groups typically have not expressed strong demands for environmental
policies.  To the extent they do have preferences over instruments, we would expect them to
favor those instruments that minimize any increases in the prices of consumer goods and
services, and this would seem to suggest cost-effective (hence, market-based) instruments over
command-and-control.66  But in practice, organized consumer groups have tended to ally
themselves with environmental organizations on most issues, pursuing environmental-quality
interests, rather than broader consumer interests.  The latter concerns have more often been
                                               
66 It is also possible to distinguish among types of market-based instruments and types of command-and-
control instruments.  This is because any environmental policy instrument that generates privately-retained
scarcity rents (such as new-source performance standards, grandfathered tradeable permits, and others) raises
consumer prices, relative to a policy that does not generate such rents (Fullerton and Metcalf 1996).The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -39-
voiced by "taxpayer organizations," but these groups usually do not become involved in the
relative minutiae of choice of environmental policy instruments.  Hence, environmental interest
groups have been effectively unopposed by other public interest organizations.
5.   SUPPLY  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY  INSTRUMENTS
There are several plausible positive political economy explanations for the nature of the
supply of environmental policy instruments.  First, legislators and their staffs are thought to be
predisposed by their predominantly legal training to favor command-and-control approaches to
regulation (Kneese and Schultze 1975).67  Similarly, unfamiliar policy instruments may require
legislators to spend time learning about them before they can provide substantial support,
thereby giving rise to a status quo bias in favor of the current regime of command-and-control
regulation.68  Both these effects may become weaker in the coming years, as a result of the
increasing understanding of economics among lawyers as well as among legislators and their
staffs (Hahn and Stavins 1991).69
Second, ideology plays a significant role in instrument choice.  A conservative
lawmaker who generally supports the "free market" might be predisposed to support market-
based instruments; a legislator with more faith in government and less faith in the private sector
might, all else equal, prefer a command-and-control approach.  Kelman (1981), in his survey of
congressional staff members, found that support and opposition to effluent charges was based
largely on ideological grounds: Republicans who supported the concept of pollution charges,
for example, offered as a reason the assertion that "the free market works," or "less
government intervention" is desirable, without any real awareness or understanding of the
economic arguments for market-based programs.  Likewise, Democratic opposition was
                                               
67 A related argument is that legislators favor command-and-control regulation simply because it is familiar to
them.
68 This argument assumes that a legislator -- or at least her staff -- needs to understand an instrument in order
to support it.  Although such understanding might not be a pre-condition for voting in favor of the instrument,
it is more necessary for other forms of support, such as insertion of a statement into the legislative history,
efforts to get a bill through committee, or attempts to persuade other legislators.  Moreover, a lack of
understanding may prove to hurt the legislator in her re-election campaign if the news media or an opponent
seek to make it an issue.  Thus, the greater the prominence of an issue, the more important it will be for a
legislator to have a compelling rationale for her position.  Responding to this need, interest groups may supply
legislators with justifications for supporting given policies (Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1989)
69 Thus, outreach efforts by economists and others may be thought to have both demand-side and supply-side
effects.  On the demand side, increased understanding of market-based instruments may have increased the
demand for these instruments by various interest groups.  On the supply side, increased understanding reduces
learning costs for legislators.  Since both effects are rightward shifts of the respective functions, the outcome is
unambiguous in terms of increased degrees of support.-40- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
largely based upon analogously ideological factors, with little or no apparent understanding of
the real advantages or disadvantages of the various instruments.
Third, constituents react to their perceptions of the costs and benefits to themselves
and others of a particular policy, regardless of the real costs and benefits (McCubbins and
Sullivan 1984, Hahn 1987).  The more visible the benefits, the greater the demand for an
instrument; the more visible the costs, the greater the opposition and thus the political costs to
the legislator.  The importance of perceived costs and benefits is a consequence of the limited
information most voters have about the details of public policy.70  Hence, politicians are likely
to prefer command-and-control instruments because they tend to hide the costs of regulation in
the price increases passed on to consumers (McCubbins and Sullivan 1984).71  In contrast,
market-based instruments, though they impose lower total costs, generally impose those costs
directly, in the form of effluent charges or prices paid for permits.72  Grandfathered permits
fare better on the visibility criterion than auctioned permits or taxes, since no money is
exchanged at the time of the initial allocation.73
Fourth, voters' limited information may also lead politicians to engage in symbolic
politics: the use of superficial slogans and symbols to attract constituent support, even when
the policies actually implemented are either ineffectual or inconsistent with the symbols
employed.  Such symbolism offers the legislator political benefits at little opportunity cost.
Command-and-control instruments are likely to be well suited to symbolic politics, because
strict standards -- strong statements of support for environmental protection -- can be readily
                                               
70 A rational voter will choose to remain ignorant on most issues, because the costs of gathering information
are likely to outweigh the nearly insignificant benefits from voting knowledgeably (Downs 1957).  In contrast,
organized interest groups with large stakes in an issue are likely to be well informed -- and thus to be over-
represented in the political process.  These issues raised by asymmetric information are particularly relevant to
instrument choice, because votes on instrument choice are often much more technical than votes on policy
goals, and therefore attract less attention from average voters (Hamilton 1995).
71 The point that politicians prefer (ceteris paribus) those regulatory instruments that make their associated
costs invisible to consumers is related to the more general notion that legislators will seek to disguise transfers
to special interests (Coate and Morris 1995).
72 As national pressures to lower the budget deficit increase, however, the cost savings and potential
government revenue offered by auctions and taxes are more likely to be politically attractive (Hahn and
McGartland 1989).
73 Hahn (1987) emphasized the importance of observable costs and benefits in explaining why Wisconsin
chose a largely state-funded pollution-credit program over an effluent charge.  The instrument offered visible
job creation, by favoring the construction of new facilities, at the expense of diffuse, less visible costs to widely
distributed third parties.  In contrast, the market-based alternative would have appeared to sacrifice jobs while
its cost-saving benefits would have been less evident.The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy -41-
combined with less visible exemptions (Hahn and Noll 1990).74  Congress has on several
occasions passed environmental laws with strict compliance standards, while simultaneously
including lax or insufficient enforcement measures.  Tradeable permits and taxes offer neither
the powerful symbolic benefits of declaring strict standards, nor as convenient a range of
options to undermine their practice.75
Fifth, if politicians are risk averse, they will prefer instruments that involve more certain
effects.76  With respect to environmental policy instruments, uncertainty is likely to arise with
respect to the distribution of costs and benefits among the affected actors and to the
implementation of the legislative decision by the bureaucracy.  The flexibility inherent in
permits and taxes creates uncertainty about distributional effects and local levels of
environmental quality (McCubbins and Page 1986).  Typically, legislators are more concerned
with the distribution of costs and benefits -- in particular their geographic distribution -- than
with a comparison of total benefits and costs (Hahn and Stavins 1991).  For this reason,
aggregate cost-effectiveness -- perhaps the major advantage of market-based instruments -- is
likely to play a less significant role in the legislative calculus than whether a politician is getting
the best deal possible for her constituents (Shepsle and Weingast 1984).  Moreover, politicians
are likely to oppose instruments (such as tradeable permit schemes) that may induce firms to
close business and relocate elsewhere, leading to localized unemployment (Hahn and Noll
1990).77 Although there will be winners as well as losers from such relocation, potential losers
are likely to be more certain of their status than potential gainers.  This asymmetry creates a
bias in favor of the status quo.78
                                               
74 Of course, the reliance of political symbols on voter ignorance may be countered by interest groups, which
are likely to be better informed.
75 See, however, Joskow and Schmalensee (1995), for an examination of Congressional attempts along these
lines in the SO2 allowance trading program.
76 As McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast state, "Legislators are likely to behave as if they are risk averse, even if
they are personally risk neutral, if their constituents punish unpredictable policy choices or their reelection
probability is nearly unity" (1989, p. 22).
77 Tradeable permits may be more likely to be adopted in cases where the industry to be regulated is relatively
dispersed and homogeneous with respect to abatement costs (Hahn and Noll 1990).  But such homogeneity also
means that the gains from a market-based approach are more limited.
78 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 provide an example of legislation built upon such compromises
(Hahn and Noll 1990).  Stringent standards for urban non-attainment areas were offset by industry-specific
exemptions and by measures preventing relocation of urban factories to less polluted areas, the so-called policy
of Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD).  The winning coalition would likely not have held up under a
tradeable permit scheme, which would have allowed rust belt firms to purchase pollution permits from firms in-42- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
For the same reason, grandfathering of tradeable permits is more likely to attract a
winning coalition than auctions, since grandfathering allows leeway in rewarding firms and
distributing the costs and benefits of regulation among jurisdictions.  Joskow and Schmalensee
(1995) have examined the political process of allocating sulfur dioxide emissions permits in the
1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act.  Their focus was on empirically measuring the role of
interest group politics and rent-seeking in how those permits were allocated, but another point
is made clear by their work: that allocating permits by grandfathering can produce fairly clear
"winners" and "losers" among firms and states.  An auction, on the other hand, would allow no
such political maneuvering.
Sixth, command-and-control instruments offer Congress greater control with respect to
the implementation of legislative outcomes by administrative agencies.  To ensure that the
interests of the winning coalition are protected in implementation, Congress may, in effect,
prescribe administrative rules and procedures that favor one group over another (McCubbins,
Noll, and Weingast 1987).  Such a practice, in theory, protects intended beneficiaries of
legislation by constraining the scope of subsequent executive intervention in implementation.
If stacking the deck is an important aspect of policy making, it is more likely to be successful in
the context of command-and-control legislation.  Market-based instruments leave the
allocation of costs and benefits up to the market, treating polluters identically (Hahn and Noll
1990).  Standards, on the other hand, allow the administrative agency greater control and
therefore open up possibilities for stacking the deck.  For example, Congress might place the
burden of proof in standard-setting onto the administrative agencies to favor industry; or
legislators might include citizen-suit provisions allowing legal action to force the enforcement
of standards to favor environmental groups.
Seventh, bureaucrats are less likely to undermine the legislative decision if their
preferences over policy instruments are accommodated.  Administrative decision makers are
likely to oppose decentralized instruments on several grounds:  they are familiar with
command-and-control approaches; market-based instruments may not require the same kinds
of technical expertise that agencies have developed under command-and-control regulation;
and market-based instruments imply a scaled-down role for the agency by shifting decision
making from the bureaucracy to private firms, undermining the prestige of the agency and the
job security of its staff (Hahn and Stavins 1991).
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6.   CONCLUSIONS
We have attempted to synthesize the seemingly diverse strands of the positive political
economy literature by viewing them as relating to component parts of a political market
framework.  In this framework, interest groups have demands for particular instruments.
Legislators, in turn, provide political support for such instruments.  The demands of the
various interest groups are aggregated, as are the supplies of support from individual
legislators.  The interaction of such aggregate demand and supply produce a legislature's
equilibrium level of aggregate support, with each member simultaneously determining her
effective support level.  The effective support levels of the various legislators are combined, in
an institutional context, to produce the legislature's choice of policy instrument.
This framework is far from complete.  We have focused on the decisions of individual
legislators, while leaving unanswered questions of how individual (and continuous) legislator
support translates into binary votes and how such support or votes are aggregated to the level of
the legislature.  For example, we do not deal with competition among legislators, only briefly have
we considered the role that congressional committees and other institutions play in structuring and
influencing instrument choice, and we have not explained how instrument choices are framed.
Likewise, we have only explored a competitive legislative model as a first approximation, and
have commented briefly on alternative approaches.  These issues represent promising avenues for
extending this framework and building a workable model of instrument choice.
In this paper, we have taken a modest step toward a unified framework for positive
analysis of policy instrument choice.  This framework may permit greater understanding than
approaches that focus almost exclusively on one component of the problem at a time.  Thus,
for example, if one considers only the benefits that a particular industry derives from a
proposed regulatory program, one might be led to conclude that a program will be forthcoming
if the benefits are sufficiently high.  Attention to questions of supply shows why this might not
be the case.  If the legislature prefers the status quo to the instrument demanded by the interest
group, and if the legislature's aggregate supply function is sufficiently inelastic, there may be no
equilibrium under which the legislature provides positive support for the demanded instrument.
Indeed, the supply function of such a legislature might be above the industry demand function
everywhere in the politically relevant domain.  Similarly, whether a large shift in the demand
for a particular instrument resulting from exogenous factors causes a comparable shift in the
actual support provided by the legislature depends on the elasticity of supply.  There will be
relatively little change in equilibrium support if supply is inelastic, but a far larger change if
supply is elastic.-44- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
This framework helps us to organize and -- to some degree -- synthesize available
explorations of the four gaps with which we introduced the paper -- three gaps between
economic prescription and political reality and one gap between past and current political
practices.  With respect to the first -- the predominance of command-and-control over market-
based instruments despite the economic superiority of the latter -- firms are likely to prefer
command-and-control standards to auctioned permits and taxes.  Standards produce rents,
which can be sustainable if coupled with sufficiently more stringent requirements for new
sources.  In contrast, auctioned permits and taxes require firms to pay not only abatement costs
to reduce pollution to a specified level, but also costs of polluting up to that level.
Environmental interest groups are also likely to prefer command-and-control instruments, for
philosophical, strategic, and technical reasons.
On the supply side, command-and-control standards are likely to be supplied more
cheaply by legislators for several reasons:  the training and experience of legislators may make
them more comfortable with a direct standards approach than with market-based approaches;
the time needed to learn about market-based instruments may represent significant opportunity
costs; standards tend to hide the costs of pollution control while emphasizing the benefits; and
standards may offer greater opportunities for symbolic politics.  Finally, at the level of the
legislature, command-and-control standards offer legislators a greater degree of control over
the distributional effects of environmental regulation.  This feature is likely to make majority
coalitions easier to assemble, because legislative compromise is easier in the face of less
uncertainty, and because the winning coalition can better guarantee that its interests will be
served in the implementation of policy.
The second gap -- that when command-and-control standards have been used, the
standards for new sources have been far more stringent than those for existing sources, despite
the potentially perverse incentives of this approach -- can also be understood in the context of
our market framework.  Demand for new source standards comes from existing firms, which
seek to erect entry barriers to restrict competition and protect the rents created by command-
and-control standards.  In turn, environmentalists often support strict standards for new
sources because they represent environmental progress,  at least symbolically.  On the supply
side, more stringent standards for new sources allow legislators to protect existing constituents
and interests by placing the bulk of the pollution control burden on unbuilt factories.
Many of these same arguments can also be used to explain the third gap: the use of
grandfathered tradeable permits as the exclusive market-based mechanism in the United States,
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tradeable permits create rents; grandfathering distributes those rents to firms, while auctioning
transfers the rents to government.  Moreover, like stringent command-and-control standards
for new sources, but unlike auctioned permits or taxes, grandfathered permits give rise to entry
barriers.  Thus, the rents conveyed to the private sector by grandfathered tradeable permits are,
in effect, sustainable.
Moreover, grandfathered tradeable permits are likely to be less costly for legislators to
supply.  The costs imposed on industry are less visible -- and less burdensome -- for
grandfathered permits than for auctioned permits or taxes.  Also, grandfathered permits offer a
greater degree of political control over the distributional effects of regulation, facilitating the
formation of majority coalitions.  In both these respects, grandfathered permits are somewhat
analogous to command-and-control standards.
The fourth and final gap -- between the recent rise of the use of market-based
instruments and the lack of receptiveness such schemes had encountered in the past -- can be
credited to several factors.  These include the increased understanding of and familiarity with
market-based instruments; niche-seeking by environmental groups interested in both
environmental quality and organizational visibility; increased pollution control costs, which
create greater demand for cost-effective instruments; attention to new, unregulated
environmental problems without constituencies for a status quo approach; and a general shift of
the political center toward a more favorable view of using the market to solve social problems.
Overall, the image is one of both demand and supply functions shifting rightward, thus leading
to greater degrees of political support for these market-based instruments over time.79
To the extent that some of the current preference for command-and-control standards
reflects simply a desire to maintain the regulatory status quo, the aggregate demand for a
market-based instrument is likely to be greatest and the political opportunity costs of
legislators providing support is likely to be least when the status quo instrument is essentially
non-existent, that is, when the environmental problem has not previously been regulated (Hahn
and Stavins 1991).  Hence, in the future, we should be more optimistic about introducing such
market-based instruments for "new" problems, such as global climate change, than for existing,
regulated problems, such as abandoned hazardous waste sites.
We end with some thoughts about how a market framework can generate empirical
work on the positive political economy of instrument choice for environmental regulation.  So
                                               
79 It is also possible that changes in some of the institutional features identified above affected individual
legislator degrees of support.  For example, changes may have occurred that led to particular legislators taking
on important committee positions, thus changing their production functions, and hence their opportunity costs.-46- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
far, most of the academic work in this area has been theoretical; very few arguments have been
subjected to empirical validation.  Several of the existing empirical studies have addressed the
question of why firms might support particular instruments, rather than whether firms actually
provide such support.  There have been no empirical studies that have constructed demand
functions by determining how much firms actually are willing to pay -- for example in the form
of lobbying expenses and campaign contributions -- to secure particular outcomes.  Similarly,
there has been no work seeking to determine the nature of demand by interest groups other
than industry.  In particular, the motives of environmental organizations merit more
consideration.  We have discussed the possible self-interested motives of such organizations,
and how their demands for particular policy instruments may be motivated by niche seeking.
But whether their expenditures in the political process comport with this theory remains
essentially untested.
On the supply side, there are substantial impediments to empirical work.  The existing
studies have primarily attempted to determine the factors that affect legislative votes on
particular programs (for example, Hamilton 1995; Pashigian 1985).  In recent years, however,
Congress has enacted a greater proportion of legislation by voice vote, rather than recorded
vote.  There has also been a shift from votes on comparatively narrow bills to votes on
omnibus bills, which make it virtually impossible to determine a legislator's actual position with
respect to specific components.  Thus, there is now less new data than previously with which
to perform studies of legislative voting behavior.
Legislative voting studies also share a substantial problem:  distinguishing votes which
reflect a legislator's true views about a bill from votes cast as part of an implicit logrolling
trade, in which a legislator votes in favor of a program that she otherwise opposes in order to
obtain a more valuable quid pro quo.80  Moreover, as we argued above, a vote constitutes
only one component of the support that a legislator can extend to a bill.  But the other
components of support, of course, are less well suited to quantitative analysis.81  Thus, in
some cases, the best way to explore empirically the supply side of the equilibrium framework
                                               
80 Kau and Rubin (1979) sought to measure the importance of logrolling with a conditional probability model
that examined votes as a function of one another, but that approach raises numerous problems (Jackson and
Kingdon 1992).
81 Silberman and Durden (1976) attempted to overcome this problem by using patterns of votes on a series of
amendments as a proxy for a continuous underlying support variable.  Such series of closely related votes,
however, are rarely available, particularly in the case of instrument choice.  In a different approach, Hall and
Wayman (1990) examined the relationship between campaign contributions and degrees of participation in
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may be through detailed case studies of the legislative decision making process, such as that
undertaken by Ackerman and Hassler (1981).
The metaphor of the market will, in the end, be an imperfect and incomplete description
of political behavior.  But there are real advantages of considering instrument choice within
this framework, and from developing more fully the details of the market metaphor and its
implications.  The ultimate test of the usefulness of such a framework will be the extent to
which it enables reliable predictions of the choices legislatures make, and the extent to which it
facilitates the design of policy instruments that are both economically rational and politically
successful.-48- Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins
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